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If, by an overwhelming consensus among economists, trade should be free, then why is it
that nearly everywhere we look, and however far back, trade is in chains? Why do nearly all
governments, unenlightened or enlightened, despotic or democratic, choose such apparently
ineﬃcient protectionist policies? In recent decades, an impressive theoretical and empirical
literature on the “political economy of trade policy” has attempted to answer this question.
The primary explanation oﬀered in this literature is that sub-optimal policies are chosen
because policies aren’t set by those who seek to maximize economic eﬃciency.1 Rather, they
are set in political contexts where the objectives of the policy-makers are diﬀerent from that
of aggregate welfare maximization. This study of “endogenous” trade policy determination,
which takes into explicit account the political circumstances under which policy is set, forms
the core of the literature on the political economy of trade policy whose empirical ambitions
and accomplishments to date this paper attempts to survey.2
The main objective of this chapter, then, is to summarize and evaluate analytically the ev-
idence in favor of endogenous protection. Conveniently for us, the literature has evolved
in quite systematic ways. The early empirical work, until at least the late 1980s, mostly
involved the examination of correlations between trade policies and various political econ-
omy factors that had been conjectured to be relevant in determining trade policy. While
helping to loosely identify the relative importance of various political economy variables in
determining policy, this literature has sometimes been criticized for employing economet-
ric speciﬁcations whose links with the theories that motivated them were often only very
tenuous. With the subsequent development of detailed theoretical platforms with strong
econometric amenability, however, the recent empirical literature has moved in a somewhat
“structural” direction establishing a much tighter link with the theory than has been tradi-
1However, see Section IV for a discussion of contexts in which maximizing economic eﬃciency (theoreti-
cally speaking) entails departures from free trade.
2Earlier surveys of the theoretical issues and contributions in this area include Hillman (1989, 1991),
Helpman (1997), and Rodrik (1995). Surveys of the empirical literature, with which this survey overlaps
in its discussion of early econometric contributions in the area, include Baldwin (1985) and Magee (1994,
1997). A textbook treatment is provided by Vousden (1990).
1tional in this ﬁeld (and, for that matter, in many other branches of economics). We begin by
describing the methods and results of the traditional literature. We then discuss the various
theoretical frameworks that have been developed to describe endogenous trade policy de-
termination and the empirical attempts to evaluate the predictions that emerge from these
theories. As with any intellectual endeavor, every success and resolution has only served
to raise additional questions and challenges. Indeed, there has been a healthy interaction
between theory and empirical work in this area, with the new set of theoretical models gen-
erating challenges and opportunities for empirical work and with the new empirical analyses,
in turn, posing challenges for future theoretical development. We discuss some puzzles that
have emerged in the current literature and discuss possible avenues for future work that may
help resolve them.
II. The Determinants of Trade Policy: Theoretical Conjectures
This section discusses the broad set of economic and political factors that were conjectured
to be relevant for trade policy determination and that formed the basis for much of the early
empirical work in this area. Several hypotheses (explicated at various degrees of theoretical
rigor and often only informally) were oﬀered in the literature to answer the central questions
of why industries received trade protection and why some industries received more protection
than others. Following Baldwin (1985), on whom the following discussion relies quite heavily,
these could be classiﬁed as follows:
• The Pressure Group or Interest Group model: This framework emphasizes the incen-
tives faced by capitalists to inﬂuence politicians to move policy in a direction that would
favor them − for example, we would expect capitalists in import-competing sectors to lobby
governments for barriers against imports. In important contributions, Olson (1965), Stigler
(1971), Peltzman (1976,) and Pincus (1975) discuss the diﬀering abilities of various industries
to overcome free rider problems and get organized to lobby government eﬀectively. Since a
small number of ﬁrms in the industry and a high degree of geographic and seller concentra-
tion imply a greater likelihood of eﬀective coordination, the theory suggests that the level of
protection in an industry and (equivalently) the ability of industries to resist trade liberaliza-
2tion should be positively linked with these variables. Olson (1983) also argues that economic
groups may be more likely to organize in a conte x to fac h a n g i n ge c o n o m i ce n v i r o n m e n tt h a t
threatens income and employment levels. This suggests further that industry protection be
negatively related to industry growth rates in output and employment and positively related
to increases in import penetration ratios. The theoretical demonstration by Mussa (1974)
and Neary (1978) of the redistributive impact of tariﬀs in the presence of speciﬁc factors
of production provided a foundation for understanding lobbying by speciﬁc factors such as
industry speciﬁc capital or labor.
• The Adding Machine model, due to Caves (1976), emphasizes the voting strength of an
industry in determining the extent of trade protection it receives. Since, according to this
theory, elected oﬃcials tend to favor industries with the largest number of voters, the level
of protection should be positively linked with the number of employees in the industry.
• The Status Quo model, due to Corden (1974) and Lavergne (1983), hypothesizes that
government oﬃcials have “conservative respect” for the status quo, based either on regard
for existing property rights (even in the form of rents generated by protection) or on a
cautious response to the uncertainty associated with changes in policy, and further that
governments wish to avoid large adjustment costs. Taken together, these dispositions imply
t h a tp r e s e n tp r o t e c t i o ns h o u l dd e p e n du p o np a s tl evels of protection, a positive relationship
between changes in tariﬀ levels and changes in import penetration, and a positive relationship
between changes in tariﬀ levels and the variables used to measure the ability of workers in an
industry to adjust to tariﬀ reductions or changes in import penetration such as the proportion
of old, unskilled and rural workers in a sector (whose ability to ﬁnd new jobs is presumed to
be lower).
• The Social Justice or Equity model, due to Ball (1967), Constantopoulos (1974), and
Fieleke (1976), emphasizes the motives of governments, on social justice grounds, to reduce
t h ed e g r e eo fi n c o m ei n e q u a l i t yi nt h ee c o n o m yb y raising the living standards of the lowest
income groups. This suggests that protection level will be high and tariﬀ cuts will be low in
sectors that employ low-income, unskilled workers.
3• The Comparative Cost hypothesis suggests that industries in which the ratio of exports
to production is high and the import penetration ratio is low will receive lower protection
since they are not likely to be perceived as needing protection by either government oﬃcials
or the management or labor force of the industry.
• The Foreign Policy model emphasizes the bargaining ability and possibilities of countries
in their trade negotiations as important determinants of trade policy outcomes. Thus, for
example, it is suggested that since developing countries had generally been exempt from the
requirement of reciprocity in matching the tariﬀ cuts oﬀered by industrial countries in the
early post war rounds of trade negotiations, duty levels in industrial countries will be higher
on the exportables of developing countries relative to the exportables of other developed
countries practicing reciprocity. As another example, it is suggested that a country would
be more willing to lower its trade barriers against a partner country in which it has substantial
direct investment (since the bargaining ability of the foreign country is improved by its ability
to restrict the ﬂow of earnings back to the investing country or otherwise lower the returns
on the investments).
T h et h e o r i e sl i s t e da b o v ep r o p o s es e v e r a lv a r i a b l e sa sd e t e r m i n a n t so ft r a d ep o l i c y :I n d u s t r y
size, employment, concentration ratios, levels of imports, changes in the level of imports, and
so on. A “ﬁrst-generation” of the empirical literature attempted to explore the relevance
of these variables using simple quantitative techniques and regression analysis. We describe
these results in the following section.
III. First-Generation Empirical Evidence
A primary contribution of the “ﬁrst generation” of empirical work on endogenous trade policy
was its demonstration of associations between protection levels and a variety of political and
economic variables.3 The robustness of these ﬁndings provided a quite convincing aﬃrmation
3The list of contributors to this literature is a long and illustrious one. It includes, among others, the
following studies by political economists and political scientists: Caves (1976), Baldwin (1985), Marvel and
Ray (1983), Ray (1981), Brock and Magee (1978), Schattschneider (1935), Destler (1986), Keohane (1984),
and Milner and Yoﬃe (1989).
4of the endogeneity of trade protection. Researchers also attempted to make inferences about
the relative validity of particular theories of endogenous policy − a less successful enterprise,
as we will argue in some detail here.
A representative set of results are presented in Table 1. Columns 1 and 2 present Baldwin’s
(1985) estimates of alternate regression models attempting to explain the cross-sectional
variation of industry tariﬀs in the United States. The dependent variable in both columns
is the average tariﬀ level for the industry in 1976. The results indicate that industries
with low wages and a high level of labor per unit of output tend to be highly protected.
This gives some support to the social justice model that we have described in the previous
section: the government, acting on grounds of equity, provides the greatest protection to
the low-income groups. They may also be interpreted as supporting, to some extent, the
status quo model: protection levels are high because the government is unwilling to lower
tariﬀs in industries with low-income (presumably unskilled and immobile) workers where the
costs of adjustment to changes in the protection level would be the harshest. The adding
machine model receives support as well: protection levels are positively related to industry
employment levels. Finally, the number of ﬁrms in the industry (an inverse measure of ﬁrm
concentration and the ability of industries to overcome the free rider problem in getting
organized to lobby) is negatively related to the level of trade protection as predicted by
pressure group theory. The comparative cost variables − the degree of import penetration
and the degree of export orientation − do not show up as being signiﬁcantly associated with
the level of tariﬀs (although they are signiﬁcant in other speciﬁcations not reported here).
The foreign tax credits variable, representing the extent of investment abroad and thus the
foreign policy model, does not appear as statistically signiﬁcant in any of the speciﬁcations.4
The measures of ﬁt seem relatively high: Up to half the interindustry variation in tariﬀs
appears to be accounted for in some speciﬁcations.
4It must be noted that Helleiner’s (1977) theory suggests, however, that it will be countries in which
there is extensive US investment that are able to bargain for lower tariﬀs. This does not necessarily imply
that the industries in which there is higher US investment abroad will have lower tariﬀso ni m p o r t s . T h u s ,
a cross-industry study of type conducted by Baldwin (1985) isn’t perhaps the best context in which to test
the foreign policy model.
5Columns 3 and 4 in Table 1 presents estimates from Baldwin’s (1985) regression model ex-
plaining tariﬀ cuts. The dependent variable is the reduction in US tariﬀs in the Tokyo round
of GATT negotiations (and is ent e r e di nt h er e g r e s s i o n sw i t hanegative sign). For the results
presented in Column 4, only industries in which the initial tariﬀ level was greater than ﬁve
percent were included. The regression results again suggest that industries with lower tariﬀ
cuts were industries in which workers tended to be unskilled and low paid. These industries
were also ones with large numbers of workers, high and rising import penetration ratios, and
high initial levels of protection. Thus, the adding machine model and the status quo model
both ﬁnd some support in these results. As Baldwin (1985) notes, however, proponents of
other models can claim some support from these results as well. While variables such as ﬁrm
concentration ratios and the number of ﬁrms in the industry, which represent the pressure
group model, are not signiﬁcant, other variables, representing (possibly) an industry’s incen-
tive to organize, such as changes in import penetration ratios and changes in employment,
are signiﬁcant. Thus, the pressure group model ﬁn d sw e a ks u p p o r ti nt h e s er e s u l t sa sw e l l .
The econometric methodology employed in estim a t i n gt h em o d e l sw eh a v ej u s td e s c r i b e di s
susceptible to criticism along several dimensions, regressor endogeneity being perhaps the
most obvious among them. And the general absence of rigorous sensitivity analyses makes it
hard to attach a great deal of credibility to inferences about any particular variable. The ﬁrst
study to address the two problems of regressor endogeneity and sensitivity to speciﬁcation
is the study of nontariﬀ barriers (NTBs) in the United States by Treﬂer (1993).5 The ﬁnal
column in Table 1 presents Treﬂer’s estimates of the determinants-of-NTB equation, where
the extent of NTB protection is measured by the NTB coverage ratio, that is, the fraction
of commodities within any industry that is subject to any type of NTB. It indicates that
comparative advantage factors (as measured by the change in the import penetration ratio,
and the exports-to-value-added ratio) matter immensely to the determination of NTBs. A
likelihood ratio test (not included in the table) indicates that comparative advantage factors
(import penetration, changes in the import penetration ratio and exports) are at least ﬁve
times as important as business interest factors (as measured by degree of concentration,
5It is additionally distinguished among empirical political economy studies of protection by its proper
econometric treatment of endogeneity of imports in a model that also addresses censoring of the data.
6scale, and capital measures). Additionally, the joint estimation of import penetration and
NTB equations leads to a much higher estimate of the import restrictiveness of US NTBs
than was in evidence in earlier studies of protection. These results illustrate the value of
positive analysis in normative contexts:6 considerations according to Treﬂer’s estimates, US
NTBs as of 1983 succeeded in restricting imports by $50 billion (that is, the import volume
would be larger by $50 billion in the absence of NTBs) − a much higher estimate than
those provided by single equation estimates that ignore the endogeneity of tariﬀs. From
this, Treﬂer calculates that the 1983 NTBs on imports of manufactures had an ad valorem
tariﬀ equivalent somewhere between twenty percent and forty percent. Lee and Swagel
(1997) estimate a similar simultaneous equation system using a broader 1989 data set of
pooled NTB data across industries and countries. They too ﬁnd evidence consistent with a
broad set of political economy theories of the determinants of protection and relatively high
estimates of the impact of protection on trade ﬂows.7
Overall, the results we have described above demonstrate the collective extent to which the-
ories of endogenous protection explain inter-industry variation in trade barriers. They also
illustrate the need to take explicit account of the positive aspects of trade policy determina-
tion in studying normative issues such as the impact of trade barriers on trade ﬂows. The
empirical results provide a measure of support to each of the theories that we have listed
above.
Which theory has the greatest explanatory power? Gawande (1998a) attempts to formally
compare (non-nested) models of endogenous trade protection using Bayesian methodology.8
6For a recent theoretical analysis that illustrates the value of taking account of political economy factors
in determining optimal policy, see Krishna and Mitra’s (2000) paper on “reciprocated unilateralism”, where
unilateral trade liberalization by one country is shown to bring to it the beneﬁt of endogenous reciprocity
by its partner due to the induced change in the political economy equilibrium in the partner country by the
initial (unilateral) liberalization.
7Another interesting exercise on the restrictive impact of NTB protection was conducted by Harrigan
(1993), who exploits the theoretical structure of the monopolistic competition model to derive expressions
for bilateral trade ﬂows, estimating them using data on bilateral trade ﬂows and bilateral trade barriers.
However, perhaps because he ignores the endogeneity problem, he ﬁnds NTBs to not be as restrictive. See
also the cross-country study by Mansﬁeld and Busch (1995).
8It is worth noting that Gawande (1998a) analyzes separately “Price NTBs” (such as antidumping duties
and countervailing duties) and “quantity NTBs” (such as quotas and voluntary export restraints), thus
7Roughly speaking, this proceeds as follows: First, in a nested comparison akin to the classic
likelihood ratio test, the likelihood of a “full model” which uses a full set of explanatory
variables relative to a model without variables representing a particular economic model (say
the adding machine model) is computed. The likelihood of the full model relative to the full
model minus variables representing a diﬀerent theory (say, the interest group theory) is then
computed. Dividing the ﬁrst ratio by the second provides a non-nested comparison of the
likelihood of the ﬁrst model relative to the other (the adding machine model relative to the
interest group model in the present example). The results using data on post-Tokyo Round
ad valorem tariﬀs are presented in Table 2. Consider, for instance, the number 6.31 × 104
in the ﬁrst column of Table 2. This indicates that the full model (F) is 6.31 × 104 times as
likely with the variables representing the special interest model (IG) than without them. The
number 39.47 below it indicates how likely the full model is relative to the full model minus
the variables that represent the adding machine (AM) model. Dividing the ﬁrst ratio by the
second yields the non-nested comparison of the IG model versus the AM model, given in
row 8 as 6.25×10−4. This exercise yields some interesting results. As the results in Table 2
indicate, in the determination of US tariﬀs, the status quo (SQ) model performs exceedingly
well. Taken together, the social justice (SJ) model and the status quo model dominate the
interest group and the adding machine models − a conclusion that Baldwin (1985) reaches
as well in the study of US tariﬀs that we have described above.9 With nontariﬀ barriers,
the dominance is reversed: the interest group and the adding machine models are prominent
and, taken together, dominate the status quo and social justice models overwhelmingly.10
allowing for these diﬀerent types of instruments to have diﬀerent eﬀects (as predicted by a number of
theories of trade under imperfect competition).
9Viewing the interest group and adding machine models as models emphasizing the short-run self-interest
motivations of various groups (including the government) and the status quo and social justice models as
emphasizing social concerns, Baldwin (1985) has concluded that “models focusing exclusively on short-run
and direct self-interest are insuﬃcient for explaining the wide range of behavior patterns observable in the
trade policy arena” and that “long-run self-interest” and “concern for welfare of other groups and the state”
are also necessary to account for trade policy outcomes. However, the association of particular theories with
short or long-run self-interest (in Baldwin’s terminology) is itself debatable. Thus, for example, a purely
cynically motivated government with the short-run self-interest objective of winning re-election may be keen
to do nothing to worsen the status-quo.
10The question of why models of NTB determination reach such diﬀerent conclusions from theories of
tariﬀ protection regarding the merits of particular theories of endogenous protection is an interesting one.
However, to our knowledge, it is a question that has not been pursued in the literature.
8A major drawback in studies that attempt to discriminate between models, as recognized,
for instance, by Gawande (1998a) and Baldwin (1985), is that they require a prior and,
importantly, one-to-one determination of which variables represent particular theories. And,
unfortunately, there are signiﬁcant overlaps. Similar (or identical) variables are argued to
be proxies for quite diﬀerent behaviors in diﬀerent models. Thus, for example, both the
pressure group model and the status quo model suggest that the level of protection should
be positively related to the import penetration ratio. In the former framework, increases in
import penetration may increase the incentives for import-competing lobbies to be formed
a n dt ol o b b yf o rh i g h e rp r o t e c t i o n ,a n di nt h elatter model the government itself responds
to increased import competition by providing higher tariﬀs in order to maintain the income
levels of individuals in the import-competing sector. Similarly, the proportion of unskilled
workers is claimed as a relevant proxy for both the social justice and the status quo models.
In the former theory, industries with unskilled workers are granted higher protection on
redistributive grounds. In the latter, protection is argued to be higher since unskilled workers
are less mobile and would suﬀer disproportionately from any attempts to lower protection to
their industries. This promiscuous relation between variables and theories and the inability
of the literature to identify variables that would separate models more sharply has precluded
the precise determination of the relative validity of the diﬀerent models.
In partial response to these challenges, and aided by theoretical development of formal models
of political economy with increasingly well speciﬁed micro-foundations, the literature has
moved in a “structural” direction, linking empirical work and the underlying theory more
tightly. In the following section, we discuss the evolution of the formal theories of trade
policy determination, from the early work of Findlay and Wellisz (1982), Hillman (1982),
Magee, Brock and Young (1989), and Mayer (1984) to the more recent models of Grossman
and Helpman (1994, 1995a), and discuss alongside the growing body of empirical work that
has attempted to test the predictions of these theories.
IV. The Determinants of Trade Policy: Theoretical Models
Where theoretical frameworks delivering speciﬁc and empirically testable predictions as to
9trade policy outcomes are concerned, there are two main branches in the literature. The ﬁrst
branch represents the direct democracy or median-voter approach. The implicit assumption
in this formulation is that trade policy is actually being directly voted upon or alternately
that the government chooses policies in a manner that reﬂects majority opinion on the
issue. The second and dominant branch represents the interest group theories that we have
mentioned before: Trade policy is seen to be determined by the interaction between the
government and organized lobby groups representing the economic interests of their members.
We discuss both sets of models and the empirical attempts to test them.
IV. 1 Median-Voter Model
In a uni-dimensional policy context (i.e., with a single policy variable under discussion, say
an import tariﬀ on a particular good) where individual preferences over this policy are single-
peaked,11 it has been shown that the median voter’s preferred policy choice (e.g., the level of
the tariﬀ) cannot be dominated in a majority voting context by any alternative. This is the
well-known median-voter result of Black (1958). Mayer’s (1984) model of endogenous pro-
tection derives the implications of this median-voter result for trade policy in the context of
fully speciﬁed general equilibrium models of trade. In the two-sector, two-factor, Heckscher-
Ohlin version of Mayer’s model, equilibrium trade policies are predicted to be as follows:
If the median voter’s ownership of capital is lower than mean ownership (as is the case in
about all countries), trade policy is biased in favor of labor (as opposed to capital).12 This
implies that equilibrium trade policies are predicted to be biased against trade in capital-rich
countries and for trade in capital-poor countries (since, as implied by the Stopler-Samuelson
theorem, trade restrictions increase returns to scarce factors in a Hecksher-Ohlin world).
We should expect to see import barriers in capital-rich countries and import subsidies in
capital poor countries. Since trade policies are almost everywhere biased against trade, this
11The determinants of individual preferences over trade policy have been studied recently by Scheve and
Slaughter (2001), who ﬁnd, using survey data, that preferences over trade policy depend upon factor own-
ership (as postulated in median-voter models of trade policy) and asset holdings.
12This should be easy to understand intuitively: As stated by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, in the
two-sector Hecksher-Ohlin model, a change in the tariﬀ on the importable raises the return to one factor
and lowers that to the other. If the median capital-labor ratio in the economy is low, the median voter will
vote for a tariﬀ policy that favors labor over capital.
10prediction of the Mayer model is almost directly refuted by the data − bad news for the
median-voter model.
Dutt and Mitra (2001) have focused, however, on a related prediction of the Mayer model
that relates not to the absolute level of the tariﬀs but to the variation in the level of tariﬀs
(as related to the degree of income inequality) across countries: It is easily veriﬁed, using the
same reasoning as above, that an increase in the gap between the median capital-labor ratio
and the mean capital labor-ratio raises barriers in capital-abundant countries and lowers
them in capital-scarce countries. To test this prediction, Dutt and Mitra (2001), using a
variety of measures of trade restrictiveness and income inequality, estimate relationships of
the following type:
TR i = α0 + α1 ∗ INEQi + α2 ∗ INEQi ∗ (K/L)i + α3 ∗ (K/L)i +  i (1)
where i indexes countries, TR denotes trade restrictions, INEQi denotes inequality in coun-
try i and (K/L)i denotes the capital-labor ratio in country i.
Note that,
∂TR
∂INEQi = α1 + α2 ∗ (K/L)i.
Given that an increase in inequality leads to more restrictive trade policies in capital-
abundant countries and less restrictive trade policies in capital-scarce countries, the the-
oretical prediction is that α1 < 0a n dα2 > 0. This is precisely what Dutt and Mitra (2001)
ﬁnd. Thus, their ﬁndings provide tentative support for the median-voter model of trade
policy determination.
The Dutt-Mitra framework conducts its analysis at a high degree of aggregation − it does not
address, to any extent, the cross-sectional variation in tariﬀs within a country. Theoretical
predictions regarding the cross-sectional pattern of tariﬀs in a median-voter context have
been obtained by Mayer (1984) and also by Helpman (1997) in an economic context (i.e.,
with demand and supply relationships) identical to that of Grossman and Helpman (1994)−
11which we have described in greater detail in Section IV.2 below.13 Tariﬀsi nt h i sf r a m e w o r k









,i =1 ,...,n. (2)
where γm
i denotes the fraction of speciﬁc capital in sector i that is owned by the median voter
(with the mean ownership normalized to one), z denotes the inverse of the import penetration
ratio and e denotes the absolute import demand elasticity. It should be readily evident that
testing this prediction requires information on the median voter’s characteristics on a sectoral
basis that would be hard, if not impossible, to obtain in most contexts. Consequently, there
have been no attempts in the literature to test the cross-sectoral predictions of the median
voter framework.
The multi-sector tariﬀ predictions in the median-voter model described above have been
derived under the assumption that ownership of speciﬁc factors is thinly dispersed in the
population. Often, this is not the case: Ownership of production-speciﬁc production factors
tends to be concentrated in the hands of relatively few agents. As Helpman (1997) points out,
considering the extreme example of highly concentrated ownership, when all of the speciﬁc
factor is owned entirely by a negligible fraction of the population, is instructive. In this case,
members of the minority group that owns the factor in an import sector would vote for an
import tax, whereas the rest would vote for an import subsidy (since they consume this good
and would prefer to see its price lowered). The majority-voting outcome should therefore
be an import subsidy. If anything, however, the opposite is generally true, i.e., import
tariﬀs are seen instead − an observation that poses diﬃculties for median-voter theory.14 A
13It is perhaps worth noting that even in a multi-sector context, the voting process is still over a single
variable − the tariﬀ rate in any sector, i. The theoretical complexities inherent in multi-dimensional voting
where various tariﬀs are voted upon simultaneously are well known and need not be repeated here. See for
example, Shepsle (1990).
14See, however, Mayer (1984) for an explanation of the power of concentrated owners that relies upon
voting costs. It is argued there that if voters face some positive costs of participating in the voting process,
individuals with small stakes in the voting process may choose not to vote because their net return from
voting is negative. This makes it more likely that the majority of those that remain will vote for a tariﬀ.
12possible resolution of this puzzle derives from the argument of Olson (1965) that it is sectors
with concentrated ownership that manage to overcome the free-rider problem and eﬀectively
lobby government to protect their sector-speciﬁc incomes. This argument gains substantial
expression in the pressure group or interest group theory of trade policy determination that
we turn to next.
I V .2I n t e r e s tG r o u pM o d e l s
The interest group model that currently occupies center stage in the literature is the frame-
work of Grossman and Helpman (1994), henceforth GH. GH models a small economy en-
dowed with labor and n speciﬁc factors. These speciﬁc factors in combination with labor
(which is mobile across sectors) produce n non-numeraire goods using CRS technology. In
addition, a numeraire good (freely traded internationally) is produced using labor and Ri-
cardian technology. Consumption preferences are identical across individuals within this
economy and the representative agent’s utility function is assumed to take the following
quasi-linear form:




where c0 denotes consumption of the numeraire good (good 0) and ci denotes consumption
of goods i =1 ....n.
In order to see the basis for the popularity of the GH model, at least from the standpoint
of empirical application, it is perhaps instructive to see what is predicted as to tariﬀ rates
in economies of the type described above by the interest group models in the literature that
preceded GH. We consider two well-known models, both important theoretical contributions
in their own right: Findlay and Wellisz’s model (1982) using what has come to be called
the “tariﬀ formation function” and Hillman’s model (1982) postulating instead a “political
support function”.15 Our discussion borrows liberally from Helpman’s (1997) survey of this
literature.
15See also Bhagwati and Feenstra (1982).
13Tariﬀ Formation Function
Findlay and Wellisz’s (1982) seminal model describes the tariﬀ rate as the outcome of lobby-
ing competition between opposing lobbies in a two-sector, speciﬁc factors, general equilibrium
of trade. The government, which receives the lobbying funds, trades oﬀ lobbying spending
by two self-interested lobbies, one for protection and one against, and is represented sim-
ply by a tariﬀ formation function (which takes the lobbying expenditure levels by the two
lobbies as its arguments). Using the same economic structure as in the GH model, as de-
scribed above, with lobbies lobbying to raise the domestic price of goods they produce and
to lower the domestic price of the other goods they consume, with lobbying expenditure
levels determined as the noncooperative outcome of a game in which each side chooses its
lobbying expenditure to maximize its net beneﬁts, and with tariﬀs ultimately determined
by a tariﬀ formation function just as in Findlay and Wellisz (1982), Helpman (1997) derives




(1 − αi)(bi − 1)




,i =1 ,...,n. (4)
In (4), αi is the proportion of the population that owns sector-speciﬁc inputs in sector i,
and bi is the marginal rate of substitution in the government’s tariﬀ formation function be-
tween the level of protectionist lobbying spending and the level of anti-protectionist lobbying
spending. While bi is positive, only when it is greater than one does a marginal dollar of
protectionist lobbying raise the tariﬀ by more than it declines as a result of an extra anti-
protectionist lobbying dollar. Hence the sector is protected only when bi > 1. If the marginal
lobbying dollars are equally eﬀective (bi = 1), there is free trade.
Political Support Function
Hillman (1982) views instead the choice of the tariﬀ rate as the solution to an optimizing
problem in which the government trades oﬀ political support from industry interests against
14the dissatisfaction of consumers. Speciﬁcally, Hillman postulates a reduced form political
support function for sector i with two arguments. The ﬁr s ta r g u m e n ti st h eg a i ni np r o ﬁts
from a trade policy that raises the domestic price (pi)o v e rt h ef r e et r a d ep r i c e( p), and the
second argument is the loss in consumer welfare due to the price increase. Political support
is increasing in the ﬁrst argument but decreasing in the second. Using the same economic









,i =1 ,...,n. (5)
In (5), api is the marginal rate of substitution in the government’s political support function
between aggregate welfare and proﬁts of special interests in sector i, which varies across
sectors. Sectors in which special interests are active (api is ﬁnite) will receive positive pro-
tection.16
A sc a nb es e e nf r o m( 4 )a n d( 5 ) ,t h et a r i ﬀ predictions of Findlay-Wellisz and Hillman (1982)
are not directly testable since they contain characteristics of the tariﬀ formation function
and the political support function − the relevant marginal rates of substitution − which vary
across sectors and are not observable. These diﬃculties are theoretically “resolved” in the
GH model, which postulates a linear government objective function that trades oﬀ lobbying
contributions with overall welfare at a constant rate, and derives closed-form expressions
for the cross-sectional pattern of tariﬀs that are directly empirically testable.17 It is to this
framework that we turn next.
Political Contributions Approach
As we have described above, Grossman and Helpman (1994) consider a multi-sector speciﬁc
16Further, as in the GH model which we discuss shortly, protection is higher the larger the sector in terms
of output-to-imports ratio, and the smaller the sector’s import demand elasticity.
17It should be readily evident that the linear form of the government objective function here pins down the
relevant marginal rates of substitution and thus avoids the diﬃculties associated with the empirical testing
of the Findlay-Wellisz and Hillman models that we have just described.
15factor economy in which individuals have the quasi-linear preferences given by (3). Some
of these sectors are politically organized. Others are not. The politically organized sectors
inﬂuence politicians through campaign contributions. Politicians, in turn, maximize a lin-
ear objective function with two distinct components: political contributions by lobbies and
aggregate social welfare. The interaction between the politicians and the lobbies is assumed
to take the form of a menu auction (due to Bernheim and Whinston (1986)) where each or-
ganized lobby presents the government with a contribution schedule specifying the promised
contribution level for each possible domestic price vector implemented by the government.
In the ﬁrst stage, lobbies present their contribution schedules, taking the contribution sched-
ules of other lobbies as a given, and anticipating a second stage in which the government
decides tariﬀs through an optimization process, taking all the lobby contribution schedules
as a given. Protection across sectors is measured as a vector of import and export taxes and
subsidies on the n goods. The GH framework makes the following prediction regarding the









,i =1 ,...,n. (6)
In (6), ti =( pi − p)/p is the ad valorem tariﬀ or subsidy on good i in equilibrium, where
pi i st h ed o m e s t i cp r i c eo fg o o di and p its world price. On the right-hand side of (6),
Ii is an indicator variable that equals one if sector i is organized into a lobby and zero
otherwise. The parameter αL is the fraction of the population organized into lobbies. Since
not all industries are necessarily organized, αL ≤ 1. a>0 is the constant weight that the
government places on aggregate welfare relative to aggregate political contributions in its
linear objective function. zi = yi/mi is the equilibrium ratio of domestic output to imports
(exports if mi is negative) and ei = −m 
ipi/mi is the elasticity of import demand (positive)
or export supply (negative).
The inﬂuence exerted by organized interests in securing trade protection is easily seen in (6).
If industry i is an import-competing producer and it is organized (Ii > 0), then it is able to
16“buy” protection and obtains a protective import tax (ti > 0). If it is an import-competing
producer but it is not organized (Ii < 0), it receives a penalizing import subsidy (ti < 0)
instead. If industry i is an exporter and is organized, it is able to “buy” an export subsidy
(ti > 0), but if it is unorganized, then its exports are taxed. Three additional factors are
emphasized: First, industry’s stakes from protection, as measured by the output-to-import
ratio, zi, determine the extent of protection the industry receives.18 Second, protection
depends inversely upon the elasticity of import demand − this follows from the familiar
Ramsey pricing scheme, that the best way to tax goods while minimizing welfare loss is to
tax goods with low (absolute) demand elasticities at a higher rate than goods with high
demand elasticities. Finally, the extent of lobbying competition manifests itself in the tariﬀ
expression. If all sectors were organized and in competition, they would cancel each other
out: with the population entirely organized, we have Ii =1f o ra l li, implying that αL =1
and ti =0f o ra l li.

















,i =1 ,...,n. (7)
Then the predictions are (i) the coeﬃcient on zi/ei is negative, (ii) the coeﬃcient on Ii×zi/ei
is positive, (iii) and since αL ≤ 1, the sum of the coeﬃcients must be non-negative. In addi-
tion to those qualitative predictions, a quantitative implication of (7) is that the coeﬃcients
on zi/ei and Ii×zi/ei m a yb eu s e dt oi n f e rt h es i z eo fa − the weight that government places
on aggregate welfare relative to the weight on aggregate political contributions.
The predictions of the Grossman and Helpman model were ﬁrst tested in two recent papers,
Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000).19 The protection
18A crude intuition may be provided as follows: The derivative of sector i’s proﬁt function with respect
to own price is xi, while the lower the imports, the lower the social cost protection imposes on the public.
Hence the greatest protection is aﬀorded to industries with the highest value of z = x/m.
19Recent work by Mitra, Thomakos and Ulubasoglu (2002) and McCalman (2001) have applied the GH
17measure in both studies is the NTB coverage ratio in the US. Estimation of (7) requires
data on two variables that are not directly measurable: import-demand elasticities and
domestic political organization. For import-demand elasticities, both studies use estimates
reported by Shiells, Deardorﬀ and Stern (1986). Both also use data on corporate political
contributions to assign the domestic political organization variable, I. The assignment of I
itself is done diﬀerently in the two studies, however. Goldberg and Maggi (1999) use various
threshold levels in campaign contributions to determine whether the domestic organization
variable is to be assigned the value 1. On the other hand, noting that the data on campaign
contributions are overall contributions and not just contributions for trade related matters,
Gawande and Bandyopadhyay assign the domestic political organization variable in the
following manner: They ﬁrst examine, using simple OLS regressions, the correlations between
campaign contributions and a number of right-hand-side variables including measures of
imports. In the next step, the organization variable is assigned the value 1 for those industries
for which the relationship between campaign spending and trade ﬂo w si sp o s i t i v e .G a w a n d e
and Bandyopadhyay also explicitly account for intermediate goods. The main results from
these two studies are presented in Table 3.
Table 3 shows that, despite the diﬀering methodologies used in assigning the domestic contri-
bution variable, both authors ﬁnd support for the theory in the data. Political organization
is found to inﬂuence the interindustry diﬀerence in trade protection in the manner predicted
by the theory. All else held constant, tariﬀs are higher, on average, in industries represented
by organized lobbies.
Two issues relating to the data used in the estimation of (7) are worth noting. First,
consider the variable on the left hand side of (7), the ad valorem rate of protection ti.I na
world in which only tariﬀ barriers are used, obtaining measures of ti would be a relatively
simple task. However, in practice, the trade barriers used are a complicated combination of
tariﬀ and nontariﬀ barriers. Indeed, trade protection has been heavily dominated in recent
decades by the use of nontariﬀ barriers. The tests of GH we have discussed so far have
model to, respectively, Turkey and Australia. Eicher and Osang (2002) performs a nonnested comparison of
predictions from the GH model with predictions from other models of political economy.
18both relied upon NTB data, using the NTB coverage ratio as a proxy for the protection
rate. However, it is unlikely that NTB coverage ratios accurately represent the actual extent
of protection. Thus, consider the extreme example of a sector in which most goods are
protected, albeit by large nonbinding quotas. The coverage ratio measure would be very
high. However, the fact that the quotas are nonbinding implies that, at least in a perfectly
competitive context, the level of actual protection is zero. Thus, the coverage ratio greatly
overstates the extent of protection in this case. Equally, in sectors in which only a small
fraction of goods are protected, but with very restrictive quotas, we have the coverage ratio
possibly under-representing the extent of protection. This points to a diﬃcult and potentially
unsurmountable issue with testing the model. Using data on tariﬀs alone in a world with
signiﬁcant NTB protection leads to inaccurate measures of the level of protection. Using
NTB coverage data leads to a measurement error of a diﬀerent sort. And constructing tariﬀ
equivalents of all NTBs with any acceptable degree of precision is an extremely challenging
task.20
A second and equally important data issue arises in the assignment of the political orga-
nization variable, I. As we have mentioned previously, existing studies have relied upon
data on corporate campaign contributions to assign this variable, thereby raising (at least)
two issues. First, the corporate campaign contributions data represent overall contributions
by corporations, not merely contributions intended to sway trade policy. The only attempt
to identify trade-related corporate contributions has been by Gawande and Bandyopadhyay
(2000), who, as we have discussed previously, assign the organization variable on the basis
of signiﬁcant association of corporate contributions with trade ﬂows. While this is a rea-
sonable ﬁrst step, it has the demerit of being altogether ad hoc. Clearly, an analytically
sound approach is desired. Second, the focus on corporate contributions has resulted in the
20Any attempt at measuring tariﬀ equivalents is inhibited additionally by the non-equivalence between
tariﬀs and non-tariﬀ instruments in imperfectly competitive contexts (Bhagwati (1965)) and the problem
that under diﬀerent modes of imperfect competiton, the same instrument may have quite diﬀerent eﬀects on
the market outcome − as seen, for instance, by a comparison of the analysis of voluntary export restraints by
Krishna (1989), who assumes Bertrand competition, with that of Harris (1985), who makes the Stackelberg
assumption instead. Practitioners will nevertheless ﬁnd useful suggestions regarding measurement method-
ology in Deardorﬀ and Stern (1998a). See also Anderson (1998a, 1998b) and Anderson and Neary (1996)
for analytical discussions of theoretically rigorous measures of protection.
19exclusion of an equally important source of political contributions, labor unions. Although
data on political contributions by labor unions is available, the problem has been that most
of the labor lobby groups are aggregate lobbies combining workers from several diﬀerent
industries. The estimation of the GH model with US data has industries disaggregated at
the 3- or 4-digit SIC level instead. It would be useful to use data on union membership
to disentangle the 4-digit composition of unions, a task that Gawande and Krishna (2001a)
have recently undertaken.
What else do we learn from the estimation of (7)? A distinguishing feature of the GH
framework − in contrast with most empirical work conducted in economics − is the very
close match between the economic model and the equation actually estimated. This match
enables inference on values of the structural parameters of the model − in this case, the
values of the parameter a which measures the preference of the government for welfare
relative to campaign contributions. Clearly, for the model to have signiﬁcance, the weight
that government places on campaign contributions (1
a) must be relatively high. The more the
government veers towards welfare maximization (i.e., the higher is a), the less appealing is
the entire political economy enterprise. The Maggi-Goldberg and Gawande-Bandyopadhyay
results suggest, however, that the estimates of a are really rather large: ranging from 100 to
3000. Although such a magnitude does not compel rejection of the model, which does not
specify any priors on the value of a, it is enough to cast doubt on the value of viewing trade
policy determination through this political economy lens.
Equally troubling is the magnitude of the political contributions in relation to the level of the
trade barriers. Thus, for instance, in the period studied by Maggi-Goldberg and Gawande-
Bandyopadhyay, overall political contributions (again, not just trade related) were in the
range of $30 million. This is quite a small number compared to the eﬃciency losses in trade
distortions alone, not to speak of the increase in producer surplus from the tariﬀs − the
relevant consideration for corporate contributors.21 Political contributors seem to be getting
am u c hl a r g e rp a y o ﬀ in terms of trade protection than is suggested by the theory. The
21That the welfare losses from protection are large is demonstrated in studies of Hufbauer, Berliner and
Elliott (1986), and Tarr and Morkre (1984).
20extent of the departures of the theoretically predicted contribution levels from the actual
contribution levels given the amount of protection that is actually observed is investigated
in Gawande and Krishna (2001b).
Finally, a direct implication of (6), as we have noted above, is that industries with higher
levels of output relative to their trade volumes, but with the same trade elasticities, are
predicted to get greater amounts of protection. As Rodrik (1995) has pointed out, this
serves to illustrate the basic puzzle in the literature of why trade policies are biased against
trade rather than being in favor of it. If the idea of comparative advantage carries any force,
specialization in exportables will imply that the exportable sector will be larger than the
importable sector. (6) implies, in turn, that, ceteris paribus, we should observe a bias towards
export subsidies rather than import tariﬀs.22 That we observe, in general, a bias in policy
against trade rather than for it is, as Rodrik (1995) has forcefully argued, a problematic
issue. While a few theoretical attempts have been made to resolve this, we know of no
empirical papers on this topic in the literature to date.
Do variables omitted from the empirical speciﬁcation (7) matter? Both Gawande and Bandy-
opadhyay (2000) and Goldberg and Maggi (1999) have estimated extended models by in-
cluding on the right-hand side of (7) a large number of additional regressors. Happily for
the GH model, the coeﬃcient on domestic organization survives (i.e., it remains positive
and signiﬁcant in most speciﬁcations). However, the estimates from the extended models
raise other issues for the GH model. Thus, an extended speciﬁcation estimated by Gawande
and Bandyopadhyay, which includes the industry concentration ratio on the right-hand side
22Rodrik argues this point in the context of a country with two non-numeraire sectors: a single import
competing and a single exporting sector. He argues that, under balanced trade, the question of which
industry gets more protection boils down to a question of which industry has the higher level of output.
With comparative advantage, the exporting sector is argued to be larger and therefore larger export subsidies
are predicted by (6). However, Rodrik’s argument regarding balanced trade and its implications for sectoral
size and therefore trade policy in GH is slightly incorrect since it ignores, among other things, the role of
the freely traded (by assumption) numeraire good in GH. The presence of this good to settle the balance of
payments implies that the non-numeraire import-competing and exporting sectors bear no relation to each
other in size. Indeed, both sectors could, in principle, be import-competing (or exporting) sectors. This
shouldn’t take away from the signiﬁcance or validity of the point that he forcefully makes as to the policy
bias against trade, however.
21in addition to the domestic organization variable, ﬁnds the coeﬃcient on the concentration
ratio to be signiﬁcant. Equally, Gawande, Krishna, and Robbins (2001), whose work we
discuss in greater detail below, also ﬁnd that concentration ratios matter for trade policy,
even after domestic organization is included in the right-hand side in the estimation of (7).
Since a primary contribution of the GH model is its detailed articulation of the interaction
between organized domestic interests and the government and the implications of this for
trade policy, the ﬁnding that the determinants of political organization (e.g., concentration
ratios, as Olson (1965) has argued and as we have discussed above) have bearing on trade
policy in a manner that is beyond that predicted by GH suggests that the role of political
organization in determining trade policy has not been fully accounted for by the theory.
An important aspect of trade policy determination that is altogether excluded from GH
and from the empirical exercises is the role played by international trade negotiations: GH
treats trade policy as if it were determined entirely by domestic political pressures. A the-
o r e t i c a le x t e n s i o no fG H ,b a s e do nt h ei d e ao fPutnam (1988), that allows for international
negotiations has, however, been provided by Grossman and Helpman (1995a).23 In their
“trade talks” equilibrium, the world trade policy vector is determined by cooperative bar-
gaining between two governments.24 Organized lobbies in both countries anticipate this in
making their political contributions to their governments. The model provides the following























where, πi denotes the world price of good i, τh
i denotes the domestic price of good i in the
home country, τ
f
i denotes the domestic price of good i in the foreign country, Xi denotes out-
23It should be immediately obvious that allowing a role for international negotiations necessitates the
abandonment of the “small country” assumption that underlies GH. A “small country’s” trade policy doesn’t
impact world prices and there isn’t any direct motivation for other countries to negotiate with it.
24Non co-operative interactions between countries, have been the subject of the theoretical and empir-
ical studies of Johnson (1953), Tower (1975), Bayard and Elliott (1994), Chan (1988), Copeland (1990),
Conybeare (1987), Gawande (1995), Milner and Yoﬃe (1989), and Riezman (1982) among others.
22put and Mi denotes volume of imports (or exports) of good i. Intuitively, with international
negotiations over trade policies, special interests in the two countries in any given industry
take opposing sides. Each would like the trade policy vector to be bent in a direction that
favors it at the expense of the other. Thus, if industry i is organized in country X, but not in
country Y, this industry is predicted to obtain positive protection in X and negative protec-
tion in Y. Empirical tests of this prediction obviously require data on cross-sectional variance
in political inﬂuences abroad. Unfortunately, actual implementation of such tests has been
inhibited, to date, by the apparent absence of any data sets on political contributions by
organized interests in other countries.
Foreign lobbies operating in the US and their inﬂuence on US trade policy are investigated
in a recent paper by Gawande, Krishna, and Robbins (2001). They observe ﬁrst that the
domestic presence of foreign lobbies could be welfare improving since foreign lobbies would
lobby to lower tariﬀs, and proceed to investigate this idea empirically. The theoretical plat-
form supporting their empirical exercise is an oligopolistic extension (with linear demand



























where Xi denotes aggregate production of i i nt h eh o m ee c o n o m y ,mi denotes imports, and
 i denotes import elasticity. As before, the constant a reﬂects the government’s preference
for welfare relative to campaign contributions, α is the fraction of the home population that
is organized into any domestic lobby and I and I∗ are dummy variables denoting domestic
and foreign organization. The model therefore implies that sectors politically represented
by organized domestic lobbies are, ceteris paribus, likely to receive more protection and
that sectors in which there is foreign political presence are likely to receive less protection.
Finally, sectors in which there is neither domestic political representation nor foreign political
presence are predicted to receive positive protection (which should not be surprising given
23the imperfectly competitive nature of the product market). The predictions are tested by
























where ti denotes the (eﬀective) ad-valorem import tax (i.e.,
τi







a+α and β3 = − 2
a+α (where, clearly, β1 and β2 are greater than zero and β3 is less than zero).
Gawande, Krishna, and Robbins (2001) estimate (9), using a recently compiled data set
on foreign lobbying presence in the United States and ﬁnd broad support for the theory.
Domestic organization and foreign organization are found to inﬂuence tariﬀsi nam a n n e r
predicted by the theory. Speciﬁcally, industries with organized foreign lobbies have lower
trade protection on average than industries without such lobbies.
One of the primary contributions of GH is that it provides the theory of government-lobby
interactions with strong micro-foundations. Nevertheless, GH takes the presence of some
organized lobbies to be given, paying little attention to the motivations of lobbies to get
organized in the ﬁrst place. From the standpoint of estimating the impact of lobbying on
trade policies (the estimation of GH’s basic equation (6), for instance), this is not a major
problem since all the right-hand-side variables, including the organization dummies I and I*,
are treated as being endogenous in the empirical implementation. However, without a theory
of lobby formation and estimates of the relative importance of the factors that determine
lobby formation we cannot answer interesting comparative statics questions such as what
happens to tariﬀs as the parameter a changes in (6), or what happens to tariﬀs if foreign
political inﬂuence is somehow legally eliminated in (8).25
25An interesting theoretical contribution has been made by Mitra (1999), who endogenizes lobby formation
in the GH framework. The decision to organize and form lobbies here is assumed to take place in a ﬁrst
stage, with the rest of the GH analytics following. Owners of speciﬁc factors in the various industries match
the beneﬁts from lobby formation to the total costs of being organized (which include any ﬁxed costs of lobby
formation itself and the contributions that the lobby ends up making to politicians), and get organized if the
former dominate the latter in magnitude. This framework yields some interesting theoretical results relating
to the impact on tariﬀs of changes in ownership distributions and changes in the government’s preference
for welfare relative to campaign contributions. The role played by the ﬁxed costs of lobby formation is key,
24Given the prominence of interest group theories of protection in the literature, surprisingly
little empirical work on the actual mechanics for lobbying for protection has been done.26
While there has been indirect evidence on pro- and anti-protectionist preferences of ﬁrms
(see, for example, Magee (1980), and Pugel and Walter (1985)), there is little direct analysis
of their trade-directed lobbying eﬀorts. The diﬃculty here is that lobbying spending is
directed at a variety of redistributive instruments, of which trade protection is but one.
Lobbying data thus comes as a bundle, and it is diﬃcult to disentangle the purely trade-
related component of lobbying data. This problem may be alleviated by considering a set of
industries whose primary lobbying concern is trade protection, as do Lopez and Pagoulatos
(1996) for the food processing and tobacco industries. But to do a full cross-sectional study
for all of manufacturing requires more care, both in the measurement of lobbying as well as
its econometric treatment.
Some progress on investigating the incentives for lobby formation and lobby behavior in the
context of trade policy determination is made in a study by Gawande (1998b), who examines
the theoretical predictions of the Magee, Brock, and Young (1989) model of lobby organiza-
tion.27 Magee, Brock, and Young (1989) formalize Olson’s (1965) intuition about how the
free-rider problem makes lobby organization more diﬃcult and arrive at predictions regard-
ing the relationship between industry lobby spending and industry beneﬁts from protection
and the relationship between contributions per ﬁrm and the extent of the free-rider problem
within the industry. Using cross-industry data on political contributions by corporate lob-
bies, Gawande ﬁnds evidence in support of these hypotheses. Gawande and Bandyopadhyay
(2000) also investigate the lobbying side of the GH (1994) model. The evidence aﬃrms the
main GH prediction that lobby spending varies according to the deadweight loss from pro-
however, and being generally unobservable, makes empirical implementation rather diﬃcult.
26This is not a comment on the state of the art on the literature on lobbying at large, which is copious.
Rather this is a comment on cross-industry studies of lobbying. To get a ﬂavor for the issues and methods in
the lobbying literature, see, for example, the surveys in Potters and Sloof (1996) and Morton and Cameron
(1992), and studies on (i) Political Action Commitee (PAC) money and election outcomes by Magee (2001b),
Levitt (1994), and Stratmann (1992), and (ii) PAC money and Congressional voting by Bronars and Lott
(1997), Baldwin and Magee (2000), Stratmann (1998), and Snyder (1992). Deardorﬀ and Stern (1998b)
provides studies on trade related lobbying.
27In this context see also the empirical study by Magee (2001a) of the free rider problem in lobby formation
motivated by the model of Pecorino (1998) and the study by Gawande (1997).
25tection. A second hypothesis on the lobbying side of the model is that competition among
lobbies induces them to spend according to the political strength of their rivals, where ri-
valry is measured in terms of lobbying competition from downstream lobbies. Gawande
and Bandyopadhyay (2000) ﬁnd that PAC spending rises with the share of an industry’s
output used by downstream industries as intermediate inputs and with the concentration of
downstream users.
Thus far, our discussion has mostly focused on the extent to which we can explain depar-
tures from free trade by appealing to the conjecture that policy makers in making their
decisions regarding trade policy place an additional value on particular groups in society
(be they immobile low income workers or corporate interests). Somewhat implicit in this
argument then, is the idea that free trade is the optimal (i.e., aggregate welfare maximizing)
policy choice for governments and the policy that would be chosen had not governments such
skewed preferences. As a caveat, it is therefore worth noting that the theoretical proposi-
tion that aggregate welfare is maximized by free trade only holds under the assumptions
of a small, decentralized, competitive economy. As is well known, the theoretical literature
on trade policy has demonstrated that with any departure from these assumptions, trade
restrictions may improve upon the country’s free trade level of welfare − even if trade re-
strictions are nearly always dominated in this regard by alternative policy instruments, as
Bhagwati (1971) has shown.28 Thus, in a wide variety of contexts, such as when a country
is “large” in the production or consumption of its tradables (and therefore has monopoly
power in trade) or in the presence of market failures, such as externalities in production
or consumption, imperfectly competitive product or factor markets or in environments in-
volving uncertainty, trade interventions have been shown theoretically to improve national
welfare.29 The literature has also argued that the practical value of such arguments for trade
policy intervention may be limited due to the presence of rent-seeking (as in Krueger (1974))
28A rich theoretical literature has developed on the issue of which policy instruments will actually be chosen
in the context of particular institutional or political realities. See, for example, Rodrik (1986), Feenstra and
Lewis (1991), Mayer and Riezman (1990), Riezman and Wilson (1997) and Rosendorﬀ (1997).
29See Bhagwati, Panagariya, and Srinivasan (1998), Helpman and Krugman (1989) and Brander (1995) for
comprehensive treatments of optimal trade policy in the presence of market failures and imperfect competi-
tion. See Eaton and Grossman (1985), Falvey and Lloyd (1991), Young and Anderson (1982), and Rodrik
(1998) for discussions of trade policy in the presence of uncertainty.
26or directly unproductive proﬁt seeking (DUP) activity (to use Bhagwati’s (1982) terminol-
ogy) that dissipates any gains or due to informational constraints that limit the government’s
ability to recognize the appropriate contexts for trade interventions when (and if) they exist.
Nevertheless, it can at least be argued that, in principle, observed interventions in trade may
be (partially) explained by governments acting in cognizance (or perception) of such factors
as externalities or imperfectly competitive product markets as we have listed above.30 With
the exception of some case studies,31 the empirical literature has, however, not examined
these as explanatory factors, or attempted to separate their explanatory power from that of
political economy factors in any systematic fashion. They remain essential topics for future
research.
V. Topics
Our discussion so far has focused on cross-sectional studies of the determinants of trade
barriers. While this has certainly dominated the research interests of scholars working in
the ﬁeld, the literature has also examined a number of other topics. These include historical
analyses of the enactments of major trade laws, attempts to discriminate between canonical
trade models such as the Heckscher-Ohlin model and the speciﬁc factors model on the basis
of observations of sectoral and class cleavages in attitudes towards trade policy, time-series
analyses of the aggregate patterns of tariﬀs, case studies of various forms of administered
protection, and the political economy of preferential trade agreements. This is an enormous
literature whose detailed description here is precluded on account of space limitations. We
limit ourselves to presenting some highlights from recent work.
V.1 Historical Studies of Major Trade Policy Measures
Irwin and Kroszner (1996) study voting patterns in the US Senate over tariﬀso ns p e c i ﬁc
goods in order to understand the factors inﬂuencing the passage of the infamous Smoot-
30Thus, for example, it is quite well recognized that the infant-industry argument for protection (whose
logic usually relies upon a combination of dynamic learning-by-doing externalities in production and credit
constraints) was commonly used in developing countries to provide protective tariﬀs for their manufacturing
sectors.
31See, for instance, Baron (1997) and Busch (1999).
27Hawley Tariﬀ Act of 1930. Contrary to some other studies which emphasize the partisan
nature of voting over Smoot-Hawley, they identify the signiﬁcant inﬂuence of economic in-
terests in Senators’ constituencies on the voting pattern.
Irwin and Kroszner (1999) study the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) of 1934
through which Congress delegated its authority over tariﬀ making to the President, giving
him the authority to undertake reciprocal tariﬀ reduction agreements with foreign countries
without congressional approval. As an example of institutional change, the enactment of the
RTAA is most interesting since it was passed just four years after the US Congress passed
the Smoot-Hawley tariﬀ, and it marked the beginning of a trend towards trade liberalization.
T h eR T A Aw a se n a c t e di nt h ec o n t e x to fs u b s t a n t i a ld i ﬀerences in opinion across parties on
the matter of tariﬀs. It was only ﬁrmly established after Republicans, long-time supporters
of high tariﬀs who originally vowed to repeal the RTAA, began to support this Democratic
initiative. Was this an ideological shift? Or was this prompted by shifting economic inter-
ests? Irwin and Kroszner use a detailed examination of the congressional voting record on
the RTAA to argue that it was increased sensitivity to exporter interests (which the institu-
tional structure of the RTAA, by providing greater incentives for exporters to develop as an
organized lobby group, itself may have had stimulated) rather than ideological shifts that
was responsible for the Republican conversion. 32
V.2 Sectoral and Class Cleavages in Attitudes Towards Trade Policy
The question of whether trade-related political behavior takes place mostly along sectoral
(industry) lines or along class (factor-ownership) lines has attracted the attention of nu-
merous economists and political scientists. Two canonical models of international trade-the
two-sector, two-factor Hecksher-Ohlin model and the Ricardo-Viner or speciﬁc factors model-
provide divergent predictions. The former, where full mobility of factors across sectors is
assumed, predicts that the country’s relatively abundant factor of production gains with
trade liberalization and that the less abundant factor loses, thus implying that there will
be a split along class lines on the issue of trade liberalization. The latter, where factors
32See Hisox (1999) for another study of the RTAA.
28of production are assumed to be speciﬁc to sector, predicts that economic interests will be
organized along sectoral lines instead.
An early empirical analysis to discriminate between these competing hypotheses was con-
ducted by Magee (1980), who examines testimony before the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee on the Trade Reform Act of 1973 and ﬁnds substantial support for the speciﬁc factors
model, that in the vast majority of industries, factors of production are aligned along sec-
toral lines. Additional support for the speciﬁc factors model is provided by the more recent
work of Irwin (1996), who examines voting patterns in the British general election of 1923,
an election that hinged on the issue of free trade, and ﬁnds the occupational structure of
t h ee l e c t o r a t et ob ef a rm o r es i g n i ﬁcant in explaining the election outcome than was class
structure. Baldwin and Magee (2000), in their examination of voting patterns by US Rep-
resentatives on major trade bills (e.g., on the North American Free Trade Agreement), ﬁnd
stronger evidence supporting the class cleavage predictions of the Hecksher-Ohlin model
than have previous voting studies: Factor status variables (such as the proportion of less
educated workers in a representative’s district) appear to have signiﬁcant impacts on voting
behavior. They ﬁnd less support for the speciﬁc factors model: Few of the variables indi-
cating occupational structure (e.g., the proportion of employment in particular industries)
had large impacts on congressional voting. However, the prior policy views of legislators,
as measured by their ratings by interest groups, were found to be important determinants
of representatives’ voting decisions. It should be readily evident, however, that to the ex-
tent that the policy positions taken by the representatives are likely to take into account
the occupational/class structure of their constituents, it is diﬃcult to infer the validity of
particular theories from these estimates (for instance, because sectoral pressures may reﬂect
themselves strongly through the policy position variable in ways that aren’t fully captured by
the variables representing the sectoral status of the district in the multivariate regressions).
V.3 Trends in Trade Policy and Time-Series Studies
The literature has discerned two distinct trends in trade policy over the past decades. First,
29trade restrictions have been falling over time − in some cases (mostly developing countries)
rather dramatically.33 And second, countries have shifted away from tariﬀst os o m e w h a t
more complex forms of non-tariﬀ protection (on which some more in section V.4 below).
Decreasing budgetary reliance on trade taxes (relative to income taxes) as countries grow
richer and develop a broader income tax base over time and a general disillusionment with
import-substitution and infant-industry arguments for protection (born of adverse experi-
ences with these policies in many instances) have both been argued to explain the trend
towards lower trade protection. These arguments do have merit. The proportion of tax
revenue contributed by trade taxes is negatively correlated with national income levels (as
Rodrik (1995) has shown). And the public expressions of unhappiness with the import-
substitution and infant-industry arguments by policy makers in many countries that have
embarked on major trade reforms have been quite well documented. We should note that
neither of the explanations of trends in trade policy rely upon political economy arguments.
To what extent ideological shifts regarding trade policy reﬂect underlying shifts in economic
interests and to what extent they are exogenous is a question that hasn’t received as much
attention in the literature as it should.34 If shifts in ideology are driven by factors outside
of the domain of political economy and distributional conﬂict, they pose new problems of
explanation.
The trend towards NTBs lacks a convincing explanation. Some analysts have argued that
NTB protection allows governments some discretion in policy after their hands have been
tied down by successive rounds of multilateral negotiation over tariﬀs. As Rodrik (1995) has
noted, this nevertheless begs the question of why countries bother with trade negotiations
when they are aware that the agreements will be ﬂouted by the use of discretionary NTBs.
33Thus, for example, in the 1980s and the early 1990s, Bolivia, Brazil, India, Mexico, Peru, and Turkey
each implemented radical reforms of their trade policies, moving from highly protectionist environments to
far more open ones.
34Irwin and Kroszner’s (1999) study of the RTAA, which we have discussed above, does illustrate the
complex interaction between economic interests, institutions and ideology in shaping policy and provides a
convincing candidate explanation for the downward movement in US tariﬀs. Nevertheless, to our knowledge,
no similar shifts in institutional structure have been proposed to explain the dramatic changes in trade policy
in the developing countries we have mentioned.
30Very little systematic empirical work on the determinants of NTBs in preference to tariﬀs
has been done to date.
While trade restrictions have trended downward overall, this has been argued to have been
quite non-monotone in some instances. Thus, in the twentieth century, the US time series
data on nominal tariﬀ revenue as a proportion of import value, or the ’ad valorem tariﬀ rate,’
has been documented by Irwin (1998) to have taken the following pattern: From around .50
in 1900, it declined to .40 in 1910 and then .16 in 1920, in part due to the Underwood Tariﬀ
Act of 1913. With the Fordney-McCumber Tariﬀ Act of 1922 it reversed direction and began
to ascend, peaking at .60 with the Smoot-Hawley Tariﬀ Act of 1930. Reversing direction
again, it declined sharply to .12 in 1950, and then dropped slowly to reach about .04 in 1980,
after the implementation of the tariﬀs agreed to at the Tokyo Round of the GATT.
A number of analysts have attempted to explain this cyclical behavior of aggregate tar-
iﬀs.35 Magee and Young base their empirical investigation of the tariﬀ data on the Magee,
Brock, and Young (1989) general equilibrium model of endogenous protection. The famil-
iar two-sector, two-factor Heckscher-Ohlin model with economy-wide mobility of factors of
production and lobbying according to class (i.e., with labor’s interests opposing that of the
owners of capital) provides the foundations for the analysis. In an attempt to capture the
political structure of the US, they develop an election model with electoral competition be-
tween two competing political parties,36 Republicans and Democrats, to explain the supply
of protection. The Republican Party is assumed to favor capitalists and the Democratic
Party labor. The probability of Republicans winning the Presidency is related positively
to lobbying by capitalists and negatively to lobbying by labor. Magee and Young’s unit of
observation is a Presidential term, yielding them twenty-one observations. Of the eight vari-
ables used in the analysis, of particular interest is the labor-capital ratio, which has direct
links with the theory. The theory implies that as capital increases relative to labor, the
election technology chooses a Republican administration, with the result that the tariﬀ falls.
35See O’Rourke and Williamson (1999) for a broad discussion of trade and immigration policy trends in
the US in the twentieth century.
36On the issue of electoral competition and special interest politics, see also Grossman and Helpman
(1996).
31Magee and Young ﬁnd evidence in favor of this eﬀect.37
Lohmann and O’Halloran (1994) examine the impact of the power structure within the US
government and the degree of conﬂict between diﬀerent branches of power on trade policy (an
approach that has its roots in Weingast and Moran (1983) and McCubbins and Schwartz
(1984)), also ﬁnding aggregate tariﬀs to be linked to political economy variables. Using
tariﬀ rate data from 1949 to 1990, they model the change in tariﬀs in order to discriminate
between three hypotheses: the pressure group hypothesis represented by economic variables,
and two “power structure” hypotheses, namely, the presidential dominance hypothesis and
the congressional dominance hypothesis. The latter hypotheses are represented by a variable
that qualitatively measures three possibilities: divided government (when the administration
and Congress are controlled by opposing parties), split partisan control (when the same party
controls the administration and a single chamber of Congress), and uniﬁed partisan control
(when one party controls the administration and both chambers of Congress). They ﬁnd a
statistically signiﬁcant association between the tariﬀ level and these variables. Among other
interesting results, they ﬁnd the President’s trade policy-making authority to be far more
constrained during a divided Congress than under a uniﬁed Congress, and US trade policy
to be far more protectionist under a divided Congress than a uniﬁed Congress.
An alternative (and rather a-theoretical) approach is taken by Bohara and Kaempfer (1991),
who run Granger tests in order to determine which factors cause variations in tariﬀ data over
time. They ﬁnd that unemployment and inﬂation are responsible for movements in the tariﬀ
time series. Their study has also generated many similar analyses of European and Japanese
data whose ﬁndings conﬁrm the Bohara-Kaempfer results are quite robust. Indeed, Lohmann
and O’Halloran (1994) also ﬁnd that tariﬀs respond to the business cycle and that changes in
tariﬀs are negatively associated with changes in inﬂation. No one has yet, however, followed
up on these empirical ﬁndings by developing formal theories of endogenous protection which
feature unemployment or the business cycle. This remains a theoretical challenge for future
37Of course, since trade policy aﬀects the incentives to accumulate capital, one expects the capital-labor
ratio itself to be a function of trade policy in the long run, implying a more complex system than the one
Magee and Young (1987) consider. This said, Magee and Young’s work remains notable for its ambitious
attempt to link theory to the data, as Leamer (1987) has noted.
32research.
Irwin (1998) casts doubt on Bohara and Kaempfer’s conclusions, showing that it is not shifts
in any underlying political economy factors, but rather that most US import tariﬀ rates have
been speciﬁc, not ad valorem, that has made tariﬀ rates appear to respond to inﬂation. The
simple fact is that, all else being equal, if the average rate is computed as a percent of import
value, it would decline when import prices rose and would rise when import prices increased.
The US average tariﬀ rate and average import price data (Irwin (1998), Figure 1) clearly
shows this relationship over time. Irwin estimates that the elasticity of the average tariﬀ
rate with respect to average import price is of the order of −.60. Since import prices were
increasing throughout the post-war period, Irwin’s results imply that the multilateral cuts
should not be unduly credited with reducing the average tariﬀ rate − a large part of the
decline is an artifact of the speciﬁct a r i ﬀs. Irwin’s inquiry into the political economy of the
average tariﬀ after controlling for the import price eﬀect takes the form of estimating the
eﬀect on the average tariﬀ of each of eight tariﬀ legislations from the Tariﬀ Act of 1872
through the 1948 formation of the GATT. While each of these legislations are found to
signiﬁcantly aﬀect the tariﬀ, thereby directly conﬁrming the presence of a political economy
component to the average tariﬀ, controlling for import prices makes their eﬀects slighter.
V.4 Case Studies in Administered Protection
Administered protection generally refers to protection resulting as a statutory response to
speciﬁed market circumstances or events, usually as determined by an administrative agency.
Several such statutes are “permitted” by the GATT/WTO under speciﬁc circumstances, in-
cluding anti-dumping (AD) duties and countervailing duties (CVDs).38 As Blonigen and
Prusa (2001) note, administered protection has emerged in recent years as the most wide-
spread impediment to trade, and while most other instruments of trade protection have
been brought under greater GATT/WTO discipline, administered protection actions (ADs
38More speciﬁcally, the GATT/WTO allows countries to levy ADs to protect their domestic industries
against ’dumping’ by foreign ﬁrms (i.e., when foreign ﬁrms sell their product at “less than fair value” in the
domestic market) and to levy CVDs if the exports of foreign ﬁrms are subsidized by their governments.
33in particular) have ﬂourished.
In the United States, the International Trade Commission (ITC) is charged with making
AD and CVD determinations. Several recent studies have examined various aspects of ADs,
CVDs, and the ITC process. Thus, for instance, Blonigen, Gallaway, and Flynn (1999) have
studied the welfare costs of ADs and CVDs, Staiger and Wolak (1994) have the studied
the protective impact of the ITC procedure (ﬁnding signiﬁcant costs even when ADs are
ultimately not granted), and Finger, Hall, and Nelson (1982) and Hansen and Prusa (1997)
have investigated the susceptibility of the ITC to being captured by special interests. The
ﬁndings of these latter authors as to the extent of the inﬂuence of special interests on ITC
decisions is interesting since the ITC process is supposed to be a purely statutory one, i.e.,
one reﬂecting merely market circumstances. These and other contributions are discussed in
greater detail in the chapter by the Blonigen and Prusa (2001) in this Handbook.39
While the ITC makes determinations in AD and CVD cases, almost all other cases (partic-
ularly, those falling under Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act regarding unfair foreign trade
practices or Special 301 cases on intellectual property rights), whether multilateral, bilateral
or regional, come under the purview of the oﬃce of the US Trade Representative. USTR
cases may be unilaterally initiated against a country by the US or, as is more likely, brought
to the USTR by private parties to achieve redress. Noland (1997), in his examination of
the political economy of USTR attentions and actions, ﬁnds that during the 1984-95 period
USTR attention was related to the size of the partner country, and that the existence of
bilateral trade imbalances suggests that more went into the formation of trade policy than
merely responding to interest group pressure.
V.5 Trade and Foreign Direct Investment
Branstetter and Feenstra (1999) jointly examine trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
in China, drawing on GH and Grossman and Helpman (1995a) to model the political process,
where, they assume, the social beneﬁts from trade and FDI liberalization are being traded
39See also Krueger (1996) for a number of interesting case studies on particular industries.
34oﬀ against the losses incurred by state-owned enterprises from such reforms.40 They use
province-level data on trade and FDI ﬂows at the four-digit level to estimate the parame-
ters of the government’s objective function (similar to the one in GH) and ﬁnd that the
government places only half the weight on consumer welfare that it does on the welfare of
state-owned enterprises.
Bhagwati’s (1985) theory of quid pro quo FDI argues that FDI may be undertaken by
foreign ﬁrms that export into the domestic market with the motive of creating jobs there
and lowering the threat that their exports will be restricted by local politicians seeking to
protect their constituents from foreign competition. A simple interpretation of this theory
suggests that politicians should cast votes for free trade in exchange for greater FDI in their
state or district. Blonigen and Figlio (1998) examine the eﬀect of state-level FDI using data
on Senate votes on trade issues from 1985 to 1994 and also study the eﬀect of district-level
changes in FDI on House trade protection votes in two high proﬁle industries: automobiles
and textiles/apparel. Their ﬁndings are somewhat ambiguous: They ﬁnd that legislators are
inﬂuenced by FDI, but in a dichotomous fashion: FDI makes protectionist lawmakers even
more likely to vote for protection in the future, while it leads politicians that generally vote
for free trade to be even less likely to vote for protection. These results are robust across
both House and Senate votes.
V.6 Preferential Trade Agreements
Various aspects of the political economy of preferential trade agreements between countries
(which often take the form of either free trade areas (FTAs), in which the parties to the
agreement maintain independent trade policies against outside countries, or Custom Unions
(CUs), in which parties to the agreement maintain a common trade policy against the out-
siders) have been studied recently. Grossman and Helpman (1995b), Krishna (1998), Levy
(1997), and Panagariya and Findlay (1996) have each analyzed theoretically the political
and economic conditions under which such agreements are entered into by countries and the
40For an alternate theoretical analysis of endogenous trade policy with FDI, see Konishi, Saggi and Weber
(1999).
35implications of such agreements for the conduct of their trade policy with countries outside
the agreement.41
Empirical work testing the predictions of these models has, however, been quite limited.42 A
recent exception is the work of Gawande, Sanguinetti, and Bohara (2001), which examines
the particular predictions of the Grossman and Helpman (1995b) framework regarding “in-
dustry exclusions” in preferential trade agreements.43 Industry exclusions in Grossman and
Helpman (1995b) are determined in a bargaining game between the member countries in
which each country brings to the bargaining table a list of industries that it wants excluded.
At the top of the lists are the most politically sensitive industries. If industry i is an import-
competing producer then it will prefer to be excluded from the agreement (or to maintain
the status quo), while if it is an exporter then it will want to be included due to the extra
proﬁts in the partner country that await it in the FTA. Industries high on the lists are likely
to be excluded from the FTA, but which country gets the greater number of exclusions de-
pends on their relative bargaining strengths. Gawande, Sanguinetti and Bohara (2001) and
Olarreaga and Soloaga (1998) using data from the MERCOSUR trade agreement between
Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay, ﬁnds evidence consistent with the predictions of
the Grossman and Helpman (1995b) theory.
VI. Conclusions
That politics plays an important role in shaping economic outcomes is an immemorial in-
sight. We have intuited for perhaps just as long that a proper understanding of political
inﬂuences in economic systems is crucial for estimating the impact of our policy choices and
41See also Cadot, de Melo, and Olarreaga (1999) and Richardson (1993) and the empirical study by
Bohara, Gawande and Sanguinetti (2001). Bhagwati (1993) and Panagariya (2000) provide excellent surveys.
Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagriya (1999) provides a comprehensive collection of papers on the topic.
42There is a sizeable empirical literature estimating the economic impact of preferential trade agreements
(including the recent work of Frankel, Stein and Wei (1997) and Krishna (2001)), but this literature has
ignored the issue of endogeneity of trade policy altogether.
43Despite the fact that Article XXIV of the GATT mandates that trade be fully liberalized between
signatories to a PTA, PTAs have almost always been accompanied by exclusions of some industries from
the agreement. This was the case for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as well as
for the European Union (EU). See Ozden and Parodi (2001) for a discussion of special industry clauses in
MERCOSUR.
36for the design of our instituitions. In this survey our attention was narrowly focused on
empirical approaches in the study of the political economy of policy interventions in trade.
Speciﬁcally, the task that we set ourselves was to chart the progress made in the litera-
ture in identifying and quantifying the role played by various political factors in shaping
trade policy. Researchers, combining a variety of data sources and methods, have provided
a convincing conﬁrmation of the presence and signiﬁcance of political-economic inﬂuences.
However, where distinguishing among several alternative theoretical conjectures of the de-
terminants of trade policy is concerned, the literature has been less successful. Inference
has generally been confounded by the insuﬃciently precise and often promiscuous link be-
tween the theoretical conjectures and the political-economic variables that have served as
their proxies in empirical exercises. The recent development of formal theories of endoge-
nous protection which are characterized by the unusual merit of directly testable predictions
has prompted a shift of the literature to a more “structural” direction − where the empir-
ical speciﬁcations have tight links with the underlying theory. As it stands, these theories
themselves are narrowly focused on a singular (albeit apparently important) determinant of
policy: lobbying by organized interest groups. While the empirical analysis has provided
a degree of evidentiary support for the theories, it has also served to highlight a number
of internal inconsistencies and puzzles. As we have discussed, many important issues re-
main unresolved. It is hoped that future theoretical development will, while maintaining its
econometric amenability, incorporate the insights of the both the theoretical and the earlier
empirical literature regarding the broader set of inﬂuences on protection, political-economic
or otherwise, and that future empirical analysis will provide a more comprehensive and
uniﬁed account of the complex set of interactions that determine trade policy.
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47Table I: Cross Sectional Studies of the Determinants of Trade Protection ∗
Variables TariﬀsT a r i ﬀ Cuts NTBs
Baldwin (85) Baldwin (85) Baldwin (85) Baldwin (85) Treﬂer (93)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CONCENTRATION
Seller Concentration 0.0002 −0.65(−3) .53∗∗
Seller Number of Firms −.46(−5)∗∗ −.32(−5)∗∗ −.14(−4) −.22∗
Scale (Output/ﬁrm) −1.83∗∗
Buyer Concentration 1.13∗∗
Buyer Number of Firms −.06∗∗
Geog. Concentration 0.11
TRADE
Import Penetration Ratio −0.02 0.17
Change in Import Penetration Ratio 0.26 0.03∗∗ 3.31∗∗
ln (Import Penetration Ratio) 0.54(−2) −0.03∗∗
Exports/ Value Added −1.82∗∗
exports/ shipments 0.34(−1)
CAPITAL




Unskilled Payroll/ Total Payroll .14∗ .97∗∗∗





%change in employment 0.84(−2) −0.11∗









Foreign Tax Credit/Assets 1.19 .90∗∗





Constant 0.26 0.15(−1) −0.81 −0.11
Adjusted R2 0.39 0.51 0.10 .18
N2 9 2 292 292 292 322
∗The dependent variable in Columns 1 and 2 of the results is the tariﬀ level prior to the Tokyo Round of the GATT. In
Columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is the average rate of tariﬀ reduction in the Tokyo Round and is entered into the
e q u a t i o n sa sanegative number. In Column 5, the dependent variable is the NTB coverage ratio in 1983. All scaling is based on
units of measurement in the original papers. See Baldwin (1985) and Treﬂer (1993) for detailed variable deﬁnition. * denotes
signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level, ** denotes signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level and *** denotes signiﬁcance at the 1 percent
level. The number in parentheses indicates the direction and number of digits the decimal point should be removed.Table II: Comparisons of Political Economy Models†
Models Compared Ad Valorem Tariﬀs Bilateral Price-NTBs Bilateral Quant-NTBs
US-Japan US-EC US-Japan US-EC US-Japan US-EC
1. F : F - IG 6.3 ∗ 104 2.31 ∗ 1025 366 4880 1540 245.3
2. F : F - AM 39.47 − 14.52 3520 99.14 581.4
3. F : F - SQ 3.98 ∗ 108 2.98 ∗ 1042 9.12 131.62 1 .12 −
4. F : F - SC 2.03 2.14 1.38 33.2 −−
5. F : F - CC 111.37 .03 ∗ 105 918.4 384.7 1780 2.86 ∗ 108
6. F : F - (IG & AM) 7.89 ∗ 105 Same as 1 63.15 1.35 ∗ 106 2.35 ∗ 104 1.25 ∗ 106
7. F : F - (SQ & SJ) 5.43 ∗ 107 4.91 ∗ 1042 15.18 1050 Same as 3 −
8. F -SI : F -AM 6.25 ∗ 10−4 − 0.04 0.71 0.06 2.37
9. F - SQ : F -SJ 5.11 ∗ 10−8 1.12 ∗ 10−43 0.15 0.25 −−
†Reproduced from Gawande (1998), Tables 5a and 5b. F denotes Full Model, IG = the Interest Group model: (PAC/VA,
Output per ﬁrm, Seller Concentration); AM=Adding Machine Model: (Number Employed, %Unionized, Number of States with
production, Seller Concentration); SQ=Status Quo model: (Import Penetration, Earnings,Post-Tokyo Round Tariﬀ); SJ=Social
Justice or Equity model: ( Share of Labor in Value-Added, Employment Growth, %Unskilled); CC=Comparative Cost model:
(Bilateral Import Penetration, Bilateral Exports/Value Added, %Scientists, %Managers). EC denotes Grance, Germany, Italy
and the U.K. Blank cells indicate that the models are not comparable since at least two representative variables have the wrong
sign. See original paper for details.Table III: Grossman and Helpman (1994) Model Estimation Results‡









‡Units on the variables are diﬀerent in the Goldberg-Maggi and Gawande-Bandyopadhyay results, so the estimates are
not directly comparable. See original papers for details on estimation procedure and variable deﬁnition. Additionally, only
an abridged version of Gawande and Bandyopadhyay’s speciﬁcation is presented here. See the original paper for the full
speciﬁcation.